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Note*

Punishing Temporary Drug-Induced
Insanity: An Analysis of State v.
Hotz, 281 Neb. 260, 795 N.W.2d
645 (2011)
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I. INTRODUCTION
On a cold December afternoon, two roommates—Joseph Hotz and
Kenneth Pfeiffer—consumed psilocybin mushrooms.1 Two hours
later, Pfeiffer was dead by Hotz’s hands.2 The intervening events
were more bizarre and horrific than any after-school special. By stabbing his roommate to death in the midst of a drug-induced paranoia,
Hotz did the unthinkable while he was unable to think.
Defenses that palliate a defendant’s criminal liability because of
intoxication are “[f]requently reviled” and “ever-controversial.”3 State
v. Hotz raises the difficult question of whether a criminal intent
formed in the midst of temporary drug-induced insanity is one deserving of punishment. The answer depends on whether the criminal law
is viewed through the prism of retributivism or utilitarianism. An act
committed in the midst of insanity, whatever its cause, is not as culpable as an act committed while sane. However, excusing an offender by
reason of temporary drug-induced insanity fails to protect the public
from a potentially dangerous individual.
In extending to other drugs its prior case law denying the insanity
defense to those temporarily insane due to the effects of alcohol, the
Nebraska Supreme Court failed to relate its decision to the conflicting
rationales of punishment. By treating Hotz’s criminal act the same as
any other, the court perhaps worked an injustice on a less than fully
culpable offender. Surprisingly, the court suggested that if only Hotz
had severely abused drugs over a prolonged period of time—instead of
experimenting with drugs recreationally—he may well have been excused of criminal liability under the settled-insanity doctrine.4
This Note begins by briefly outlining the defenses of insanity and
voluntary intoxication, both in Nebraska and beyond. Next, this Note
provides an outline of the status of both temporary and settled druginduced insanity, both in general and in Nebraska. Following the
overview of the relevant criminal law, the facts and holdings of State
v. Hotz will be recounted.
1. State v. Hotz, 281 Neb. 260, 262, 795 N.W.2d 645, 648 (2011).
2. Id. at 263–64, 795 N.W.2d at 649.
3. Meghan Paulk Ingle, Note, Law on the Rocks: The Intoxication Defenses are Being
Eighty-Sixed, 55 VAND. L. REV. 607, 608–09 (2002).
4. See Hotz, 281 Neb. at 273–74, 795 N.W.2d at 655–56.
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This Note’s analysis starts by tracing the different strands of the
settled-insanity doctrine and the justifications for its existence. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the settled-insanity doctrine, as contemplated by the Supreme Court of Nebraska and expounded
elsewhere, is unsound on retributive grounds. Next, this Note discusses how the competing aims of retributivism and utilitarianism,
particularly incapacitation, are set in conflict by temporary drug-induced insanity. Finally, this Note concludes that the best way for the
law to address offenders like Hotz is through an offense of reckless or
negligent intoxication. Culpability, and therefore criminal liability,
should be based on the offender’s decision to become intoxicated and
not the criminal act committed in the midst of temporary drug-induced insanity.
II. INSANITY DEFENSE BACKGROUND
A.

Insanity Defense Generally

The insanity defense, “developed as a means of saving from retributive punishment those individuals who were so different from others
that they could not be blamed for what they had done,”5 has ancient
and geographically varied origins. A defense based on the offender’s
insanity is found in ancient Muslim, Hebraic, Roman,6 and Chinese
law.7 Marcus Aurelius, Roman emperor from AD 121–180, is credited
with the maxim furiosus solo furore punitur—madness is its own sole
punishment.8
The four tests for insanity employed by modern courts in the
United States are the M’Naghten, Model Penal Code (MPC), “irresistible impulse,” and Durham or “product” tests.9 Of these four, the
M’Naghten and MPC tests are the most commonly used.10 Under the
M’Naghten test:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring
5. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(c)(6), at 372 (4th ed. 2003).
6. Brian E. Elkins, Idaho’s Repeal of the Insanity Defense: What are We Trying to
Prove?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 151, 161 (1994).
7. JOHN BIGGS, JR., THE GUILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 31
(1955).
8. Id. at 47.
9. Leslie A. Johnson, Note, Settled Insanity is Not a Defense: Has the Colorado Supreme Court Gone Crazy? Bieber v. People, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 259, 262 (1994).
The early English test for insanity pre-dating M’Naghten—often termed the “wild
beast test,” which excused an offender by reason of insanity if he was “totally
deprived of his understanding and memory, so as not to know what he is doing,
no more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast”—did not survive to the modern
era. BIGGS, supra note 7, at 88.
10. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 943, 959 (1999).
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under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong.11

Although they materially differ in other elements of the defense,12 the
MPC,13 Durham,14 and “irresistible impulse”15 standards also require
some form of mental disease, defect, or illness.
The insanity defense became the object of legislative reform following the acquittal of John Hinkley Jr.—the failed assassin of President
Reagan—by reason of insanity.16 During the late 1970s, twenty-four
states made their insanity standards less inclusive.17 For its part,
Congress considered a number of proposals to abolish the insanity defense but eventually settled on evidentiary and procedural reforms.18
Some states, not satisfied with procedural limits, entirely abolished
the insanity defense which, prior to 1979, had been recognized in
every state in the Union.19 Although courts voided early legislative
attempts to abolish the insanity defense as violations of due process,20
the judiciary proved more amenable to such legislation toward the end
of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries.21
Currently, four states—Idaho, Utah, Montana, and Kansas—do not
excuse offenders by reason of insanity.22

11. M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722; 10 Cl. F. 200, 210.
12. For example, the “irresistible impulse” test does not require that the offender not
have understood the nature and consequences of his act or its wrongfulness. See
LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 7.3(a), at 389.
13. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962) (requiring a “mental disease or defect”).
14. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (holding that an
offender is excused “if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
mental defect”), overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
15. See Regina v. Oxford, (1840) 173 Eng. Rep. 941, 950; 9 Car. & P. 525, 546 (“If
some controlling disease was, in truth, the acting power within [the offender]
which he could not resist, then he will not be responsible.”).
16. See Elkins, supra note 6, at 154.
17. ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 31 (1991).
18. Elkins, supra note 6, at 154–55.
19. See Andrew M. Levine, Note, Denying the Settled Insanity Defense: Another Necessary Step in Dealing with Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 78 B.U. L. REV. 75, 79
(1998).
20. See State v. Lange, 123 So. 639, 641–42 (La. 1929); Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581,
584–87 (Miss. 1931); State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1023–24 (Wash. 1910).
21. See State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914 (Idaho 1990); State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840 (Kan.
2003); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992 (Mont. 1984); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359
(Utah 1995).
22. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (2007); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (LexisNexis 2003).
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Insanity Defense in Nebraska

The M’Naghten standard was established early in Nebraska23 and
has remained the only test for insanity used in the state.24 Early decisions, however, distinguished between “partial” and “general” insanity. In Thurman v. State,25 the defendant was charged with
“shooting with intent to kill” and attempted to interpose an insanity
defense.26 The defendant was apparently lucid at times and the district court instructed the jury “[t]hat the law recognizes partial as well
as general insanity; that a person may be insane upon one or more
subjects, and sane as to others.”27 The district court further instructed the jury that “[i]t is not every delusion that can be considered
an insane delusion. The delusion must be of such a character that, if
things were as the delusion imagined them to be, they would justify
the act springing from the delusion.”28 The Nebraska Supreme Court
affirmed the instructions.29
In Kraus v. State,30 the jury was given the insanity instruction approved in Thurman but without any limitation for those defendants
who were only “partially” insane.31 The Nebraska Supreme Court
called the distinction between the “generally” insane and the “partially” insane (those who had insane delusions but were otherwise
sane) arbitrary and overruled Thurman.32 The court found that excusing offenders by reason of insanity only if they would have been
justified in acting had their delusions been reality “practically holds a
man confessed to be insane, accountable for the exercise of the same
reason, judgment, and controlling mental power, that is required of a
man in perfect mental health.”33
23. See Wright v. State, 4 Neb. 407, 409 (1876) (“[M]ental incapacity may result from
various causes, such as non-age, lunacy, or idiocy, and whenever interposed as a
defense, the inquiry is necessarily reduced to the single question of the ability of
the accused to distinguish between right and wrong, at the time of committing
the act complained of.”).
24. See NJI2d Crim. 7.0 cmt. (1992 ed.). Although the procedure of the insanity defense in Nebraska is determined by statute, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2203 (Reissue 2008), the substantive rules of the insanity defense have largely remained
the province of the courts. See State v. Hotz, 281 Neb. 260, 270, 795 N.W.2d 645,
653 (2011).
25. Thurman v. State, 32 Neb. 224, 49 N.W. 338 (1891), overruled by Kraus v. State,
108 Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895 (1922).
26. Id. at 224–26, 49 N.W. at 338–39.
27. Id. at 227, 49 N.W. at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id. at 226, 49 N.W. at 338 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. Id. at 227, 49 N.W. at 339.
30. Kraus v. State, 108 Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895 (1922).
31. Id. at 334, 187 N.W. at 896.
32. Id. at 336, 342, 187 N.W. at 897, 899.
33. Id. at 339, 187 N.W. at 898 (quoting State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 387 (1871))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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III. VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION DEFENSE BACKGROUND
A.

Voluntary Intoxication Defense Generally

In contrast to insanity, early English common law did not allow a
defendant’s voluntary intoxication at the time of the alleged criminal
act to mitigate his criminal culpability.34 Voluntary intoxication was
instead sometimes treated as an aggravation of the offense35 and was
not allowed as evidence to prove that the defendant did not have the
mens rea required for the crime charged.36 Sir Edward Coke, reflecting on the law’s treatment of intoxicated defendants, called an intoxicated person a “voluntarius demon.”37 Early American courts
followed the stern English view.38 During the nineteenth century,
however, courts began to re-examine how they treated defendants who
were intoxicated at the time of their alleged crimes.39 By the end of
the century, the practice of using a defendant’s voluntary intoxication
as evidence to show that he did not possess the requisite mens rea was
established on both sides of the Atlantic.40
The voluntary intoxication defense,41 however, has not been available to defendants for all crimes. Traditionally, the defense has been
restricted to defendants charged with a crime that requires a “specific,” as opposed to a “general” intent.42 Despite various definitions of
34. Lawrence P. Tiffany, The Drunk, the Insane, and the Criminal Courts: Deciding
What to Make of Self-Induced Insanity, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 226 (1991).
35. State v. Painter, 63 S.E.2d 86, 91 (W. Va. 1950); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25–26; JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 349 (2006).
36. See Tiffany, supra note 34, at 226.
37. State v. Wilson, 144 N.W. 47, 51 (Iowa 1913).
38. Ingle, supra note 3, at 613.
39. See Evers v. State, 20 S.W. 744, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1892) (noting that in the
preceding sixty years there had been a persistent effort in English and many
American courts to allow the jury to consider the defendant’s intoxication to determine whether a crime had in fact been committed).
40. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 46–47 (1996).
41. The “defense” of voluntary intoxication is a failure of proof claim in which the
defendant attempts to show that the prosecution cannot prove guilt because the
defendant did not possess an element of the crime, almost always mens rea.
DRESSLER, supra note 35, at 349. If a defendant’s voluntary intoxication prevented him from forming the requisite specific intent, he is acquitted of that
crime but may be convicted of another offense, often one only requiring a general
intent. See Phillip E. Hassman, Annotation, Effect of Voluntary Drug Intoxication Upon Criminal Responsibility, 73 A.L.R.3d 98, 121 (1976). Furthermore, if
the defendant was incapable of possessing the specific intent required at the time
of the criminal act, he may still be convicted of the crime if he formed the intent
prior to his intoxication. People v. Kelly, 176 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Mich. Ct. App.
1970). The involuntary intoxication defense is an excuse defense. Generally, an
offender that has committed a crime will be excused if, due to his involuntary
intoxication, the offender was rendered temporarily insane at the time of the
criminal act. See, e.g., United States v. F.D.L., 836 F.2d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir.
1988).
42. See Kelly, 176 N.W.2d at 437.

508

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:502

specific intent,43 the predominant view is that specific intent is “some
intent in addition to the intent to do the physical act which the crime
requires.”44 However, courts have consistently allowed evidence of
voluntary intoxication to negate the mens rea requirement of an offense when the offense does not neatly fit the usual definition of specific intent. The most common example is premeditation and
deliberation in cases of first-degree murder.45 The specific/general intent distinction has been roundly criticized by both courts46 and
academics.47
As with the insanity defense, the voluntary intoxication defense
became the subject of legislative scrutiny during the 1970s, when increased use of the defense coincided with a rise in crime rates.48 In
response, state legislatures, and occasionally courts,49 severely limited the relevance of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication50 or made a
defendant’s voluntary intoxication irrelevant to the question of
whether the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea for a given
crime.51 Abolishing the voluntary intoxication defense altogether has
generally been found constitutional by state courts52 and has the approval of the United States Supreme Court.53
43. See Matthew J. Boettcher, Voluntary Intoxication: A Defense to Specific Intent
Crimes, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 33, 41–42 (1987).
44. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 9.5(a), at 474.
45. See Note, Intoxication as a Criminal Defense, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1214–15
(1955).
46. See, e.g., Kelly, 176 N.W.2d at 444 (“The right to interpose this defense should
depend on something more substantial than a technical distinction that was
seized upon by a judge 130 years ago and adopted by other judges to reach results
thought sound in the cases then before them.”).
47. See, e.g., Ingle, supra note 3, at 630 (criticizing the general/specific intent distinction as “attempting to impose an artificial construct, unsupported by scientific
evidence, on the eternal conundrum presented by the intoxicated actor: ‘What
was he thinking?’ ”).
48. Id. at 614. Statistics showed a strong correlation between consumption of alcohol
and other drugs and violent crime. One study reported that in 50% of homicides,
62% of aggravated assaults, and 50% of incidents of spousal abuse, the offender
was intoxicated with alcohol at the time of the criminal act. Id. at 614 & n.40.
Another study reported that in 1989, more homicides were committed by an intoxicated offender than with a firearm. Mitchell Keiter, Just Say No Excuse: The
Rise and Fall of the Intoxication Defense, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 482, 483
(1997).
49. See White v. State, 717 S.W.2d 784 (Ark. 1986) (holding that voluntary intoxication is no longer a defense to any crime).
50. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 308 (West 1998) (limiting the voluntary intoxication defense to determinations of the degree of murder for which a defendant may
be held criminally liable).
51. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 153 (West 2002).
52. E.g., State v. Souza, 813 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Haw. 1991). But see State v. Egelhoff,
900 P.2d 260 (Mont. 1995), rev’d, Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
53. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
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B.

Voluntary Intoxication Defense in Nebraska

Despite some limited criticism of the distinction,54 prior to April
14, 2011,55 Nebraska recognized the general/specific intent version of
the voluntary intoxication defense.56 In addition to crimes requiring a
specific intent, Nebraska allowed the defendant to introduce evidence
of his voluntary intoxication to rebut the prosecution’s evidence regarding the “state of mind elements” of deliberation, premeditation,
purpose, and willfulness.57 The Nebraska Supreme Court rarely
made the specific/general intent distinction explicit, preferring to give
a more generalized statement of the rule: “Ordinarily, voluntary intoxication does not justify or excuse a crime, unless an accused is intoxicated to an extent or degree that the accused is incapable of forming
the intent required as an element of the crime charged.”58 Yet, the
term “specific intent” occurred fairly regularly in early Nebraska Supreme Court opinions,59 and the court again affirmed the distinction
in the first months of 2011, writing that voluntary intoxication “may
be considered to negate specific intent.”60 Most of the crimes for
which a voluntary intoxication instruction has been affirmed—firstdegree murder,61 burglary,62 assault with intent to rape,63 robbery,64
theft,65 and larceny66—are consistent with the principles applied by
other specific/general intent jurisdictions.67
54. See State v. Reynolds, 235 Neb. 662, 691, 457 N.W.2d 405, 423 (1990) (alteration
in original) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 4.10, at 554 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[I]t may
be said that it is better, when considering the effect of the defendant’s voluntary
intoxication upon his criminal liability, to stay away from those misleading concepts of general intent and specific intent.”).
55. L.B. 100, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011).
56. NJI2d Crim. 8.0 cmt. (1992 ed.).
57. Id.
58. State v. Lixey, 238 Neb. 540, 543, 471 N.W.2d 444, 446 (1991) (citing State v.
Saltzman, 235 Neb. 964, 970, 458 N.W.2d 239, 244 (1990)).
59. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 42 Neb. 503, 516, 60 N.W. 916, 922 (1894).
60. State v. Hotz, 281 Neb. 260, 270, 795 N.W.2d 645, 653 (2011) (citing Tvrz v.
State, 154 Neb. 641, 48 N.W.2d 761 (1951)).
61. E.g., State v. Lamb, 213 Neb. 498, 508, 330 N.W.2d 462, 468 (1983).
62. E.g., State v. Coleman, 196 Neb. 721, 723, 246 N.W.2d 61, 62 (1976).
63. Head v. State, 43 Neb. 30, 33, 61 N.W. 494, 495 (1894).
64. E.g., State v. Barnes, 185 Neb. 384, 388–89, 176 N.W.2d 18, 21 (1970).
65. State v. Lixey, 238 Neb. 540, 541–43, 471 N.W.2d 444, 445–46 (1991) (defining
“theft” as “tak[ing], or exercis[ing] control over, movable property of another with
the intent to deprive him or her thereof”).
66. E.g., Daugherty v. State, 154 Neb. 376, 380–81, 48 N.W.2d 76, 78–79 (1951)
(quoting McIntosh v. State, 105 Neb. 328, 328, 180 N.W. 573, 573 (1920)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining “larceny” as the “unlawful and felonious
stealing, taking, and carrying away of the personal property of another . . . with
the felonious intent on the part of the taker to permanently deprive the owner of
his property”).
67. See supra section II.A.
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The legal effect of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication, however, is
no longer in the Nebraska Supreme Court’s hands. L.B. 100, signed
into law on April 14, 2011, provides: “A person who is intoxicated is
criminally responsible for his or her conduct. Intoxication is not a defense to any criminal offense and shall not be taken into consideration
in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of
the criminal offense . . . .”68 Thus, a defendant’s voluntary intoxication is no longer relevant to the question of whether a defendant possessed the requisite mens rea for a given crime in Nebraska.
IV. TEMPORARY AND SETTLED DRUG-INDUCED
INSANITY BACKGROUND
A.

Temporary and Settled Drug-Induced Insanity Generally

At the crossroads of the insanity and voluntary intoxication defenses lies “temporary” and “settled” drug-induced insanity. The law
has long distinguished the immediate intoxicating effects of the consumption of drugs from a mental impairment that lingers after the
initial high has passed.69 The former, labeled “temporary insanity,”
has not been allowed to excuse a criminal act.70 Blackstone deemed
temporary drug-induced insanity an “artificial, voluntarily contracted
madness.”71 Although temporary insanity raises the “potentially provocative” question of whether an intent formed in the midst of a druginduced hallucination or psychosis is the same as an intent formed in
the mind of a sober man, it has not provoked much debate among
courts in the United States.72 Virtually all jurisdictions that have directly addressed the question of whether temporary insanity may operate as an excuse have answered in the negative.73 Most have easily
68. L.B. 100, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011).
69. DRESSLER, supra note 35, at 356.
70. Boettcher, supra note 43, at 33 (“It is by now hornbook law that voluntary intoxication of any degree affords the accused no excuse for crime.”).
71. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25.
72. Ingle, supra note 3, at 635.
73. See State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Iowa 1974); Parker v. State, 254 A.2d
381, 388 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969); Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1982); State v. Sexton, 904 A.2d 1092, 1110 (Vt. 2006). State legislatures have shared the same view as their courts. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.77.030(3) (West 2002) (“No condition of mind proximately induced by the voluntary act of a person charged with a crime shall constitute insanity.”). Although
no jurisdiction directly addressing the issue has excused an offender by reason of
his temporary drug-induced insanity, several have implicitly done so. For example, temporary insanity as an excuse was “implicitly recognized” in Webber v.
United States, 395 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1968), “necessarily implied” in United
States v. Stewart, 443 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971), “apparently recognized” in People v. King, 181 Colo. 439 (1973), and “strongly implied” in State v. Painter, 135
W. Va. 106 (1950). Hassman, supra note 41, at 130–33. A fifteen-year-old that
killed his two sisters after inhaling glue fumes was apparently also excused by

2012] PUNISHING TEMPORARY DRUG-INDUCED INSANITY 511
reached this decision by declaring that intoxication, at least the immediate effect of intoxication, is not a mental disease or defect.74
Settled insanity or, as it is occasionally still called, delirium
tremens,75 is the second form of insanity that arises solely through the
consumption of drugs. In contrast with temporary insanity, the defense of settled insanity has long received a warm reception from the
courts. Works as early as Sir Matthew Hale’s History of the Pleas of
the Crown recognized that an offender may be excused for a criminal
act committed in the midst of a “fixed phrenzy” caused by prolonged
drug consumption.76 Although some jurisdictions require that the offender’s consumption of drugs have been “prolonged” and the resulting
insanity be “permanent,” such limitations are not universal.77 At its
broadest, settled insanity is merely a mental impairment caused by
drug consumption, amounting to insanity, that lasts beyond the period
of immediate intoxication.78 Of the courts that have had the opportunity to determine whether settled insanity will excuse an offender, all
but one79 have determined that it does.80 The drafters of the MPC
appear to support the majority view.81 Nevertheless, a substantial
number of jurisdictions have not had the opportunity to decide the issue,82 and settled insanity remains “relatively novel and rarely
discussed.”83

74.

75.

76.
77.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.

83.

reason of his temporary insanity in a juvenile case in Detroit. See Comment,
LSD—Its Effects on Criminal Responsibility, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 365, 371 (1968).
See Gray v. State, 731 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Souza,
813 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Haw. 1991); Sexton, 904 A.2d at 1110; State v. Wicks, 657
P.2d 781, 782 (Wash. 1983). Some state legislatures have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-230(3) (1993).
Todd Paul Myers, Halcion Made Me Do It: New Liability and a New Defense—
Fear and Loathing in the Halcion Paper Chase, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 603, 632
(1993).
State v. Wilson, 144 N.W. 47, 51–52 (Iowa 1913).
See supra section IV.A.
See Parker v. State, 254 A.2d 381, 388 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969) (defining settled
insanity as where “the insanity not only existed while a person was under the
influence of intoxicating spirits as an immediate result of imbibing, but existed
independent of such influence, even though the insanity was caused by past
imbibing”).
See Bieber v. People, 856 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1993).
State v. Sexton, 904 A.2d 1092, 1103 (Vt. 2006).
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. at 362 (1962).
See Levine, supra note 19, at 87–88 (reporting that twenty states had not yet
addressed whether offenders with settled insanity would be excused for the
crimes they commit).
Id. at 98.
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Temporary and Settled Drug-Induced Insanity in
Nebraska

Hotz first addressed temporary insanity caused by a drug other
than alcohol, but the Nebraska Supreme Court has long held that the
immediate effects of alcohol intoxication, regardless of their severity,
do not entitle a defendant to an insanity instruction.84 The court first
addressed this question in the 1879 decision Schlencker v. State, answering in the negative.85 Schlencker restricted the legal significance
of the offender’s voluntary alcohol intoxication to the issue of whether
he deliberated and premeditated the homicide.86 The court later affirmed the principle that the immediate effects of alcohol consumption
cannot excuse an offender of his crime.87
L.B. 100 in effect codified the Nebraska Supreme Court’s no-excuse
rule. The act, in pertinent part, provides: “[I]nsanity does not include
any temporary condition that was proximately caused by the voluntary ingestion, inhalation, injection, or absorption of intoxicating liquor, any drug or other mentally debilitating substance, or any
combination thereof.”88
Yet the distinction between the immediate and lingering effects of
drug use has long been made, although rarely discussed at length, in
the opinions of the Nebraska Supreme Court. In Schlencker, the court
affirmed the following jury instruction: “[S]ettled insanity, produced
by intoxication, affects the responsibility in the same way as insanity
produced by any other cause. But insanity immediately produced by
intoxication does not destroy responsibility where the patient, when
sane and responsible, made himself voluntarily intoxicated.”89 The
court found that the offender experienced “a mere temporary frenzy”
and “[t]here was not a syllable of evidence of the existence of settled
insanity.”90 Five years after Schlencker was decided, the court
explained:
The law recognizes a wide distinction between those cases where the mental
derangement results from voluntary periodical intoxication, and the condition
of insanity or imbecility produced by protracted over-indulgence in the use of
liquor. Drunkenness in the first class of cases is never, strictly speaking, a
defense, although generally admissible, as bearing upon the question of intention, where the crime charged includes a specific intent.91
84. See Ford v. State, 46 Neb. 390, 400, 64 N.W. 1082, 1085 (1895) (“ ‘Drunkenness is
no excuse for crime.’ The soundness of this statement cannot be successfully
controverted.”).
85. Schlencker v. State, 9 Neb. 241, 252, 1 N.W. 857, 861 (1879).
86. Id.
87. See State v. Reynolds, 235 Neb. 662, 693, 457 N.W.2d 405, 423 (1990); State v.
Tvrz, 154 Neb. 641, 651, 48 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1951).
88. L.B. 100, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011).
89. Schlencker, 9 Neb. at 252, 1 N.W. at 861.
90. Id. at 253, 1 N.W. at 862.
91. Hill v. State, 42 Neb. 503, 516, 60 N.W. 916, 919 (1894).
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Although the term “settled insanity” appears nowhere in the opinion, Kraus v. State92 held that a defendant whose hallucinations were
solely a product of prolonged consumption of alcohol was entitled to an
insanity instruction. While in the midst of a bizarre hallucination, the
defendant attempted, but failed, to kill himself by jumping off a windmill, then killed his wife and two young children, and then again
failed to kill himself with a self-inflicted gunshot to the head.93 Although the defendant had consumed “considerable quantities” of alcohol preceding the homicides, he based his insanity defense on his
status as a “paranoic,” a condition resulting from “the continued and
excessive use of alcoholic liquors.”94 As the defendant had no marital
difficulties and was a loving father, the “only motive that could be
ascribed for his act, except that of insanity, was his [immediate] intoxication and discouragement over farming affairs and over the condition of his prospective wheat crop.”95 Although the case was
remanded for a new trial, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that
“[t]he evidence in the case very strongly point[ed] to the conclusion
that the accused was insane, and he was entitled to have that defense
fully protected.”96
Although L.B. 100 expressly provides that temporary drug-induced
insanity is not an excuse for a criminal act,97 debate on the bill revealed that the senators understood that the settled drug-induced insanity doctrine was recognized in Nebraska and would not be
disturbed by the legislation. Senator Colby Coash, the introducer of
the bill, explained during floor debate:
[Temporary drug-induced insanity] is not to be confused with that of someone
who acquires a mental illness caused by a prolonged pattern of consistent
drug and/or alcohol abuse, nor is it to be confused with someone who has become impaired because of involuntary ingestion of drugs or alcohol. Both exceptions are currently recognized and do not seek to be changed by an action
in this bill . . . .98

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Kraus v. State, 108 Neb. 331, 187 N.W. 895 (1922).
Id. at 332–33, 187 N.W. at 896.
Id. at 332, 187 N.W. at 896.
Id. at 333, 187 N.W. at 896.
Id. at 341, 187 N.W. at 899.
L.B. 100, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011).
Transcript of Floor Deb. on L.B. 100, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. 10 (Neb. 2011) [hereinafter Floor Deb. on L.B. 100] (statement of Sen. Coash). Senator Coash reiterated
this point before the Judiciary Committee: “We know that someone’s prolonged
use of drugs or alcohol can permanently damage the receptors in the brain, and
we know that that can cause permanent brain damage. We don’t seek to address
that in this bill . . . .” Hearing on L.B. 100 Before the Judiciary Comm., 102d Leg.,
1st Sess. 54 (Neb. 2011) (statement of Sen. Coash).
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V. FACTS, PROCEDURAL POSTURE, AND DISPOSITION OF
STATE V. HOTZ
Joseph Hotz and the victim, Kenneth Pfeiffer, were roommates and
students at Chadron State College.99 At approximately 4 p.m. on December 5, 2008, both consumed psilocybin mushrooms and smoked
marijuana.100
At 6 p.m., the Chadron Police Department received the first of two
911 calls reporting the rampage of a young man through a residential
neighborhood.101 Police responding to the calls apprehended Hotz after a foot pursuit.102 Hotz was able to tell the officer where he lived,
and when police arrived at the address, they found Pfeiffer’s body lying in a hallway and blood covering the walls.103 The autopsy of Pfeiffer’s body revealed that he had sustained fifty-one “sharp force” type
injuries, four of which were potentially fatal.104
From late in the evening of December 5th and into the early morning hours of December 6th, Hotz was interviewed by Sergeant Monica
Bartling of the Nebraska State Patrol.105 Hotz told Bartling that after he had taken the mushrooms, he developed a feeling of “not existing,” and the dynamic between himself and Pfeiffer became
antagonistic.106 Hotz said he felt that Pfeiffer was mocking him and
“all his intellectual pursuits” and that it was “kill or be killed.”107
Pfeiffer became aggressive, Hotz brandished a knife, and a scuffle ensued after which Hotz ran down to the basement.108 After returning
from the basement, Hotz told Bartling that Pfeiffer refused to leave
him alone and that Hotz feared for his life.109 Hotz stabbed Pfeiffer in
the arm and Pfeiffer yelled at him, “Joey, this is real! This is real!”110
A second scuffle erupted in the hallway and Hotz had a hazy memory
of his repeatedly stabbing Pfeiffer.111
Hotz was charged with first-degree murder, attempted murder, attempted robbery, terroristic threats, and four counts of use of a deadly
weapon to commit a felony in the District Court of Dawes County.112
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

State v. Hotz, 281 Neb. 260, 262, 795 N.W.2d 645, 648 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263, 795 N.W.2d at 648–49.
Id. at 263–64, 795 N.W.2d at 649.
Id. at 265, 795 N.W.2d at 649.
Id. at 264, 795 N.W.2d at 649.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Kerri Rempp, County Attorney Files More Charges Against Hotz, THE CHADRON
RECORD, Dec. 18, 2008, http://rapidcityjournal.com/thechadronnews/news/county-
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Hotz filed a timely notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense and
claimed that he was temporarily insane as a result of his ingestion of
psilocybin mushrooms.113 The State filed a motion in limine to prohibit expert testimony on the issue of insanity on the ground that Hotz
was not laboring under a mental disease or defect at the time of the
offenses.114 Although it was unclear from the record whether the motion was granted or denied, the district court instructed the jury that
Hotz had given notice of his intent to rely on the insanity defense.115
At trial, Hotz presented expert testimony from Dr. Daniel Wilson,
who told the court that at the time of the alleged crimes, Hotz was
suffering from “hallucinogen-induced psychosis” and “hallucinogen-induced delirium,” both of which are included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.116 The State objected on lack of
foundation and relevancy grounds and the district court sustained the
objection.117 Hotz made an offer of proof during which Dr. Wilson
stated that Hotz’s temporary insanity “obliterated his ability to know
right from wrong.”118
At the conclusion of evidence, Hotz requested that the jury be given
an insanity instruction.119 The district court refused and instead instructed the jury on the voluntary intoxication defense.120 The jury,
however, seemed confused and submitted a question to the court:
“From the beginning the jury was under the impression that we were
to determine insanity or not. Why was the change made for our decision?”121 Nevertheless, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the
charges of second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder,
terroristic threats, and three counts of use of a weapon to commit a
felony.122 Hotz’s timely motion for a new trial was overruled and the
district court sentenced him to 46 to 135 years imprisonment, including 20 to 50 years for second-degree murder.123 All sentences were
ordered to run consecutively.124
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed two issues: (1)
whether the voluntary use of drugs other than alcohol may give rise to
an insanity defense, and (2) whether Hotz was entitled to a new trial

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

attorney-files-more-charges-against-hotz/article_753885f2-eb0a-5b06-ad8e-dbd0
f3823d4e.html.
Hotz, 281 Neb. at 265, 795 N.W.2d at 650.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 265–66, 795 N.W.2d at 650.
Id. at 267, 795 N.W.2d at 651.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 267–68, 795 N.W.2d at 651.
Id. at 268, 795 N.W.2d at 652.
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because the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on insanity constituted an “[i]rregularity in the proceedings,” given the court’s ruling
on the State’s motion in limine and Hotz’s reliance on the defense at
trial.125
The court first addressed the issue—one of first impression—of
whether temporary drug-induced insanity caused by a drug other
than alcohol could excuse Hotz for his criminal acts.126 The court affirmed the denial of Hotz’s request for an insanity instruction on the
basis of the M’Naghten test’s mental disease or defect requirement.127
Noting the uniformity with which other jurisdictions refuse to excuse
offenders by reason of their temporary insanity, the court stated “that
temporary insanity brought on by voluntary intoxication is not a
‘mental disease or defect’ as understood under the common law.”128
The court also emphasized that Hotz’s claimed temporary insanity
was voluntarily produced and that he was aware, by virtue of his previous experiments with psilocybin mushrooms, of the effect they could
have on his mental processes.129 The court explained that “[w]hile the
mental state resulting from extreme intoxication may in some cases be
‘tantamount to insanity,’ . . . its origin as a self-induced impairment
fundamentally distinguishes it for most courts from a naturally occurring mental disease or defect that leads to insanity.”130 Regarding the
risks that Hotz knowingly assumed by taking psilocybin mushrooms,
the court said: “He had taken mushrooms in the past and had experienced anxiety and delusions. Hotz was well aware of the mind-altering effects the mushrooms might have.”131
The court, however, distinguished temporary drug-induced insanity from settled drug-induced insanity. The court explained: “The
general rule can be summarized as follows: ‘Insanity combined with,
or resulting from, intoxication is a defense to homicide if it is of a permanent nature and meets the test of insanity generally . . . .’ ”132 The
court identified the rationales for the distinction as the futility of punishing those with settled insanity and the moral remoteness of the
past drug consumption.133 Hotz’s condition, the court emphasized,
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 269, 278, 795 N.W.2d at 652, 658 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 269, 795 N.W.2d at 652.
See id. at 277–78, 795 N.W.2d at 657–58.
Id. at 274, 795 N.W.2d at 656.
Id. at 277, 795 N.W.2d at 657–58.
Id. at 277, 795 N.W.2d at 657 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Sexton, 904
A.2d 1092, 1100 (Vt. 2006)).
131. Id. at 277, 795 N.W.2d at 657–58.
132. Id. at 272, 795 N.W.2d at 654 (quoting 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 23, at 386–87
(2006)).
133. Id. at 273–74, 795 N.W.2d at 655.
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was only temporary and “there [was] no evidence that he suffered permanent mental problems from his use of drugs.”134
The court, however, granted Hotz a new trial on the ground that
the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on insanity amounted to
an irregularity in the proceedings.135 Although the district court’s
ruling on the State’s motion in limine was unclear, Hotz relied on the
defense for the entirety of the trial proceedings. Furthermore, the
question submitted to the district court by the jury during deliberations was evidence that the jury believed it was to decide the question
of insanity.136 The court concluded that “Hotz’s ability to mount a defense was severely compromised when he was barred from asserting
the insanity defense at what amounted to the eleventh hour.”137
VI. THE TWO PRONGS OF SETTLED DRUG-INDUCED
INSANITY
A.

“Intermittent” Settled Insanity

A handful of jurisdictions excuse offenders because of their settled
drug-induced insanity without requiring that the mental impairment
be permanent138 or produced by a prolonged period of over-consumption. An early case representative of what might be called the “intermittent” version of the settled-insanity doctrine is the 1851 decision
United States v. McGlue.139 The defendant, the second officer on a
ship, killed the first officer while the vessel was on the high seas or
within the dominion of the Imaum of Muscat.140 No evidence showed
the defendant had a prolonged history of alcohol abuse, only that he
“had drunk intemperately of the ardent spirit of the country during
some days before the occurrence.”141 Justice Curtis, instructing the
jury, defined “delirium tremens” as consisting of delirium, sleeplessness, and tremulousness, ending when “sleep occurs, and reason thus
returns.”142 Although Curtis defined insanity in terms of the defendant’s incapacity “to distinguish between right and wrong” and “un134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 277, 795 N.W.2d at 658.
Id. at 280, 795 N.W.2d at 659.
Id. at 278–79, 795 N.W.2d at 658–59.
Id. at 280, 795 N.W.2d at 659.
The intermittent prong of the settled-insanity doctrine should not be confused
with temporary drug-induced insanity. Temporary drug-induced insanity is comprised of a mental impairment lasting only so long as the immediate intoxication.
See supra section IV.A. Intermittent settled insanity requires that the mental
impairment linger beyond the immediate period of intoxication, although it need
not, in contrast with prolonged and permanent settled insanity, linger
permanently.
United States v. McGlue, 26 F. Cas. 1093 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1096.
Id.
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derstand[ ] the nature of his act,” he did not instruct the jury that the
defendant had to prove such incapacity was the result of a mental disease or defect.143 McGlue’s statement of the settled-insanity doctrine,
however, has persisted in some pockets of the United States despite a
requirement that the defendant prove he suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the criminal act.144
Courts applying this expansive version of the settled-insanity doctrine have excused offenders despite the short period of preceding
drug abuse and the briefness of their insanity. For example, in Porreca v. State,145 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, despite requiring long-term drug abuse,146 held that a defendant was entitled to
assert a settled-insanity defense even though his insanity preceding
the criminal act was intermittent and he returned to sanity two to
four months after the crime.147 The Florida Supreme Court in Britts
v. State148 held that a ten-day “drunk” causing a lingering mental impairment could excuse an offender.149 In People v. Conrad,150 the
Michigan Court of Appeals determined that an offender who killed his
brother could be excused by reason of settled insanity that ended six
weeks after his brother’s death and was caused by two weeks of PCP
use.151
B.

“Prolonged” and “Permanent” Settled Insanity

During the same period McGlue was decided, however, some courts
interpreted the settled-insanity doctrine narrowly and excused an offender only if he had engaged in long-term, chronic drug abuse that
resulted in permanent insanity. As the Georgia Supreme Court explained in 1886, “if the mania, insanity or unsoundness of mind,
though produced by drunkenness, be permanent and fixed, so as to
destroy all knowledge of right and wrong, then the person thus laboring under these infirmities would not be responsible.”152 This narrower version of the settled-insanity doctrine has been adopted by a
number of courts.153
143. Id. at 1095.
144. See State v. McNally, 336 So. 2d 713, 714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Porreca v.
State, 433 A.2d 1204, 1208 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); Commonwealth v. Herd,
604 N.E.2d 1294, 1298 (Mass. 1992).
145. Porreca, 433 A.2d 1204.
146. Id. at 1208.
147. Id. at 1206.
148. Britts v. State, 30 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1947).
149. Id. at 364.
150. People v. Conrad, 385 N.W.2d 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
151. Id. at 281.
152. Beck v. State, 76 Ga. 452, 453 (1886).
153. See McNeil v. United States, 933 A.2d 354, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Jones v. State,
648 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Hartfield, 388 S.E.2d 802,
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Courts applying the prolonged and permanent settled-insanity test
have denied offenders the insanity defense on the basis of the relative
brevity of their history of drug abuse and the lingering effects of such
abuse. For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia held in White v.
Commonwealth154 that an offender’s heavy use of cocaine over a
three-month period was not the “long-term, chronic, and habitual
abuse” the settled-insanity doctrine required.155 Likewise, in State v.
Sexton156 the Vermont Supreme Court held that the offender’s use of a
medley of illegal drugs over a two-month period preceding his crime157
was not a lengthy enough period of drug abuse.158 Instead, the court
determined that the settled-insanity doctrine was intended to only apply in cases where the drug abuse lasts “many years” and results in
organic brain damage.159 Finally, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in
Morgan v. Commonwealth,160 held that an offender’s mental recovery
following his decision to seek medical treatment precluded the application of the settled-insanity doctrine because the offender’s insanity
was not “permanent.”161
C.

Is Differential Treatment of Settled and Temporary
Insanity Justified?

On their face, it may be hard to reconcile opinions such as McGlue,
which assume a “settled” insanity that disappears with a good night’s
sleep, with opinions such as Beck, which speak of a settled insanity
that never ends. The early cases regarding each prong of the settledinsanity doctrine seem to describe two distinct lingering mental impairments that can result from the abuse of drugs: withdrawal symptoms and cumulative organic brain damage.162 Viewed in this
context, the “intermittent” version of the settled-insanity doctrine
seems to provide some merit to the near-uniform decisions of courts,
such as Hotz, to deny the insanity defense to the temporarily insane
but to allow it for the settled insane. After all, in order to have withdrawal symptoms, the addict must withdraw from an actual habit of
drug consumption. Whereas the conduct of the temporarily insane de-

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

804 (S.C. 1990); State v. Sexton, 904 A.2d 1092, 1102 (Vt. 2006); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 646 S.E.2d 899, 905 (Va. Ct. App. 2007).
White v. Commonwealth, 636 S.E.2d 353 (Va. 2006).
Id. at 358.
State v. Sexton, 904 A.2d 1092 (Vt. 2006).
Id. at 1103–04, 1113–14.
Id. at 1103–04.
Id.
Morgan v. Commonwealth, 646 S.E.2d 899 (Va. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 905.
See LSD—Its Effect on Criminal Responsibility, supra note 73, at 371 (noting the
failure of modern courts to make a distinction between settled insanity caused by
alcoholism and the withdrawal from alcohol).
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fendant shows only the naked desire to become intoxicated, insanity
due to drug withdrawal is the result of the defendant’s desire to rid
himself of his demons and, in the process, remove the danger that his
drug consumption poses to the public.
Yet whatever merit this distinction may have had has been lost by
modern courts that apply a broad definition of settled insanity encompassing “intermittent” impairments. It is doubtful that the ten-day
“drunk” in Britts163 or the two-week PCP binge in Conrad164 resulted
in an addiction to drugs, the withdrawal from which caused the defendants’ insanity. Furthermore, Conrad exposes another flaw within
the broad version of the settled-insanity doctrine when it is extended
to drugs other than alcohol. Once PCP is metabolized by the user’s
body following consumption, it is stored in fat cells and is re-released
into the user’s bloodstream when the fat cells are activated.165 Thus,
the initial high a PCP user experiences and the high that the defendant in Conrad experienced are one and the same. Neither is due to
withdrawal from the drug or organic brain damage. Instead, both
highs are the result of the body’s absorption of PCP via the blood
stream. That one high occurred immediately and the other at a later
point is not sufficient to declare an act committed in the former PCP
daze a culpable act and an act committed in the latter PCP daze
excusable.
In Hotz, the Nebraska Supreme Court suggested that it contemplates the prolonged and permanent version of the settled-insanity defense.166 The distinction between temporary drug-induced insanity
and the prolonged and permanent prong of settled insanity, however,
is similarly difficult to justify. Under its prolonged and permanent
version, the settled-insanity doctrine is often justified on the ground
that the offender’s earlier decisions to consume drugs in excess have
become so morally remote over time that he is not culpable for later
criminal acts.167 As Justice Story famously wrote, “[t]he law looks to
the immediate, and not to the remote cause; to the actual state of the
party, and not to the causes, which remotely produced it.”168 This justification, however, is contrary to principles of retributivism. As the
Colorado Supreme Court, the only court to reject altogether the settled-insanity doctrine, explained:
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Britts v. State, 30 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. 1947).
People v. Conrad, 385 N.W.2d 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
McNeil v. United States, 933 A.2d 354, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
See supra Part V.
See, e.g., State v. Sexton, 904 A.2d 1092, 1102 (Vt. 2006) (“The underlying rationale for the settled insanity doctrine is generally explained . . . as a compassionate concession that at some point a person’s earlier voluntary decisions become so
temporally and ‘morally remote’ that the cause of the offense can reasonably be
ascribed to the resulting insanity rather than the use of intoxicants.”).
168. United States v. Drew, 25 F. Cas. 913, 914 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828).
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There is no principled basis to distinguish between the short-term and longterm effects of voluntary intoxication by punishing the first and excusing the
second. If anything, the moral blameworthiness would seem to be even
greater with respect to the long-term effects of many, repeated instances of
voluntary intoxication occurring over an extended period of time.169

The Nebraska Supreme Court denied Joseph Hotz, a recreational
user of psilocybin mushrooms, a potential excuse but suggested that if
he had chronically abused the same drug over a period of years such
that he “suffered from permanent mental problems from his use of
drugs,”170 he would have been excused. But Hotz would not become
afflicted with “permanent mental problems” without abusing psilocybin mushrooms a countless number of times, thereby voluntarily
putting himself in the same dangerous mental state that precipitated
the death of Kevin Pfeiffer a countless number of times. If Hotz’s culpability was based, at least in part, on the reckless or negligent decision to ingest hallucinogenic drugs, his culpability would seem to be
much higher if he were a chronic, rather than a recreational, drug
abuser. After Hotz, “[t]he message is clear—under the criminal law, it
is better to be a chronic drug abuser than an occasional one.”171
Excusing offenders because of their settled insanity, defined by
prolonged drug abuse resulting in a permanent insanity, on the basis
of “moral remoteness” is also speculative. While “[o]ne should not be
blamed for every harmful act that can be linked to a much earlier
transgression,”172 this may not be the situation in cases applying the
prolonged and permanent prong of the settled-insanity doctrine. Although an offender may have begun abusing drugs years before, it is
possible that it was a drug binge last month, last week, or even the
day before the criminal act that pushed the offender’s mental state
past the point of willful control and into the hinterland of insanity.
The prolonged and permanent version of the settled-insanity doctrine may also create perverse incentives for a drug abuser considering ending his consumption of drugs and seeking medical treatment.
Because the defendant in Morgan v. Commonwealth had stopped using drugs and sought treatment for his liver condition, his mental
state improved.173 As a result, he was denied the possibility of an
excuse.174 Therefore, in the wake of Morgan, “clever” drug abusers
could continue to consume drugs and refuse treatment in order to
avoid criminal liability. Morgan also raises the question of whether
an offender’s insanity that is “permanent” at the time of the criminal
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Bieber v. People, 856 P.2d 811, 817 (Colo. 1993).
State v. Hotz, 281 Neb. 260, 277, 795 N.W.2d 645, 658 (2011).
Johnson, supra note 9, at 270.
DRESSLER, supra note 35, § 24.05(B), at 356.
Morgan v. Commonwealth, 646 S.E.2d 899, 905 (Va. Ct. App. 2007).
Id.
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act and the trial would continue to be “permanent” if the offender later
received proper medical care.
The prolonged and permanent version of the settled-insanity doctrine is also sometimes justified on the ground that the offender
desires only the immediate effects of drug abuse and not its lingering
effects,175 or that while drug abusers are aware that consuming drugs
will immediately impair their mental states, they may be less aware
that drug abuse could also cause a lingering mental impairment.176
As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained in 1892:
There is no difference between the two kinds of insanity, so far as the mental
status concerned, but they differ widely in their causes and results. The first
is from drinking as a remote result, the second from drinking as a direct result. The first is an involuntary result from which all shrink alike, the second
is voluntarily sought after. In the first, there is no criminal responsibility; but
in the second, responsibility never ceases.177

As long as a drug user is aware of the possibility of a lingering mental
impairment, however, it is not clear why the fact that he did not desire
that particular impairment should impact his criminal liability. And
it is difficult to argue that drug users are no longer aware of the potential for mental impairments lasting beyond the immediate period of
intoxication. Rejecting this justification for the settled-insanity defense, the Colorado Supreme Court wrote:
We do not see any qualitative difference between a person who drinks or takes
drugs knowing that he or she will be momentarily “mentally defective” as an
immediate result, and one who drinks or takes drugs knowing that he or she
may be “mentally defective” as an eventual, long-term result. In both cases,
the person is aware of the possible consequences of his or her actions.178

Although rarely emphasized in judicial opinions, if the distinction
between the prolonged and permanent version of settled insanity and
temporary insanity has any redeeming ground, it is the utilitarian justification of incapacitation.179 Because an offender excused by reason
of his insanity generally will be committed to a mental health facility
only so long as his insanity persists,180 an offender excused by reason
of temporary insanity will be released immediately after acquittal unless he has other mental impairments that justify his commitment.
An offender excused by reason of permanent insanity caused by pro175. See, e.g., Porreca v. State, 433 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (explaining that the difference between temporary and settled drug-induced insanity is “one between the direct results of drinking, which are voluntarily sought
after, and its remote consequences”).
176. See Parker v. State, 254 A.2d 381, 388 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969).
177. Evers v. State, 20 S.W. 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1892).
178. Bieber v. People, 856 P.2d 811, 816 (Colo. 1993).
179. This justification may create some theoretical incongruities because utilitarianism is a rationale for punishment and the confinement of an offender found not
guilty by reason of his insanity is not considered punishment.
180. MARTIN R. GARDNER & RICHARD G. SINGER, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 377, 1163–64 (4th ed. 2004).
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longed drug abuse, however, will continue to be confined for an indefinite period following his acquittal.181
VII. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RETRIBUTIVISM
AND UTILITARIANISM
A.

Retributivism and Punishing the Temporarily Insane

The strongest support for excusing criminal acts committed by an
offender in a state of temporary drug-induced insanity lies in the offender’s lack of culpability for his criminal act. There lies a wide gulf
between the moral culpability of a person who forms an intent to kill
another while in full possession of his mental faculties and a person
who, like Joseph Hotz, forms that intent in the midst of insanity
caused by a chemical agent.182 If the law regards an actor not culpable for a criminal act committed while insane,183 why is Hotz
culpable?
Courts have, in fact, had little difficulty in finding criminal acts
committed by an offender in a fit of temporary drug-induced insanity
culpable. As one early court asserted:
[T]here is, in truth, no injustice in holding a person responsible for his acts
committed in a state of voluntary intoxication. It is a duty which everyone
owes to his fellow-men and to society, to say nothing of more solemn obligations, to preserve, so far as it lies in his own power, the inestimable gift of
reason.184

Modern courts continue to look back in time to when the offender committed the charged criminal act and pin culpability on the decision to
become intoxicated.185 More precisely, courts find the offender’s decision to become intoxicated culpable because in so doing the offender
181. See People v. Kelly, 516 P.2d 875, 882 (Cal. 1973) (emphasizing that an offender
who is excused by reason of settled insanity will be subject to confinement in a
mental institution), superseded by statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 22 (West 1999), as
recognized in People v. Boyer, 133 P.3d 581, 622 (Cal. 2006).
182. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 181, at 564 (2d ed. 1961).
183. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 259.
184. People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9, 18 (N.Y. 1858).
185. See State v. Maik, 287 A.2d 715, 721 (N.J. 1972) (“The required element of badness can be found in the intentional use of the stimulant or depressant.”); State v.
Wicks, 657 P.2d 781, 784 (Wash. 1983) (Utter, J., dissenting) (“The central reason
for prohibiting the assertion of mental conditions brought on by voluntary intoxication as a complete defense is that one who consumes alcohol or drugs should
realize the possibility of potentially dangerous effects.”). But see Commonwealth
v. Herd, 604 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (Mass. 1992) (“We are unwilling, in order to justify a homicide conviction, to permit the moral fault inherent in the unlawful
consumption of drugs to substitute for the moral fault that is absent in one who
lacks criminal responsibility.”). The no-excuse rule regarding temporary druginduced insanity bears some resemblance to the felony-murder rule in that both
hold a person criminally liable because an earlier “wrong” is causally connected to
a later harm. See Jerome Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1067 (1944).
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may have been negligent or reckless as to the risk that his intoxication
could cause him to harm another person.186 The Nebraska Supreme
Court’s emphasis on the fact that Hotz’s prior experimentation with
psilocybin mushrooms had given him knowledge of the drug’s effects
and caused him to experience paranoia on at least one prior occasion,
along with its lack of emphasis on the brutal manner in which Pfeiffer
died,187 suggests that Hotz’s culpability was grounded, at least in
part, on his possibly reckless or negligent decision to consume a
hallucinogen.
Pushing the crime back in time from Hotz’s killing of Pfeiffer to his
decision to consume psilocybin mushrooms, however, places the
court’s decision on shaky retributive grounds. In doing so, the court
embraced “the abandoned notion that one who intentionally commits
a serious wrong is so vicious a person that he should be liable for any
consequences however unforeseeable and unsought.”188 The treatment of offenders who commit criminal acts while temporarily insane
from the immediate effects of intoxication is one of the few remaining
areas of the law where the “evil mind” approach to mens rea remains
in use.189 Under this ancient view of mens rea, a defendant who had,
in the words of Blackstone, an “evil mind” or “vicious will” was liable
for any criminal act he committed in this state of mind regardless of
whether he had a culpable mental state in regard to the particular
act.190 The evil mind approach to mens rea was rejected in the country that spawned it over a century ago191 and, with the current element-based understanding of mens rea,192 has no place in the
criminal law.
B.

Utilitarianism and Punishing the Temporarily Insane

While the unfairness of holding an offender liable for an act committed in a state of temporary drug-induced insanity is difficult to
deny, proponents of the no-excuse rule have balanced this unfairness
186. See Tiffany, supra note 34, at 241–42; see also People v. Velez, 221 Cal. Rptr. 631,
637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that for defendants who were rendered unconscious due to their voluntary intoxication “the imposition of criminal responsibility . . . is predicated on a theory of criminal negligence”).
187. See supra Part V.
188. Hall, supra note 185, at 1070.
189. The similarity between the “evil mind” understanding of mens rea and recent
decisions by courts and legislatures to deny the voluntary intoxication defense
altogether is even stronger. After L.B. 100, an offender who, because of his intoxication, lacked the requisite mental state for the crime with which he is charged
will be unable to prove that he did not commit the crime because his lack of a
culpable mental state is negated by his prior wrong of becoming intoxicated. See
L.B. 100, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011).
190. GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 180, at 388.
191. See Regina v. Pembliton, (1874) 12 Cox C.C. 607 (Eng.).
192. See GARDNER & SINGER, supra note 180, at 422.
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against the utilitarian concern of protecting the public.193 As one
court explained:
In the forum of conscience there is no doubt considerable difference between a
murder deliberately planned and executed by a person of unclouded intellect,
and the reckless taking of life by one infuriated by intoxication; but human
laws are based upon considerations of policy, and look rather to the maintenance of personal security and social order, than to an accurate discrimination
as to the moral qualities of individual conduct.194

If the purpose of the insanity defense is, as some have suggested, to
allow the state to incapacitate an offender who continues to pose a
potential threat to the public but deserves to be acquitted due to his
lack of culpability,195 then this purpose would not be served by allowing an excuse based on temporary drug-induced insanity. Because
Hotz’s “mental disease” dissipated one day after he committed the
criminal acts,196 excusing him by reason of insanity would have resulted in a true acquittal. Although the Nebraska Supreme Court did
not discuss its decision in terms of incapacitation, other courts addressing the issue of temporary drug-induced insanity have explicitly
made the link.197
VIII. THE MENTAL DISEASE REQUIREMENT
The Nebraska Supreme Court expressly denied Hotz an insanity
defense because of his inability to prove that he suffered from a
mental disease or defect, as required by Nebraska’s M’Naghten-based
insanity defense.198 Other courts have also concluded that the mental
disease or defect requirement bars an excuse based on temporary
drug-induced insanity.199 Yet early American decisions did not consider intoxication to be an affliction wholly separate from insanity but
rather a species of insanity that should not be excused because of its
origins in the offender’s vice.200 This reasoning has also been applied
in some modern jurisdictions which include a mental disease or defect
193. Keiter, supra note 48, at 506.
194. People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9, 18 (N.Y. 1858).
195. See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 7.1(b), at 370 (discussing but not endorsing the
theory).
196. Brief for Appellee at 9, State v. Hotz, 281 Neb. 260, 795 N.W.2d 645 (2011) (No. S10-105).
197. See, e.g., State v. Maik, 287 A.2d 715, 721 (N.J. 1972) (“[T]o say that one who
offended while under such influence was sick would suggest that his sickness
disappeared when he sobered up and hence he should be released. Such a concept would hardly protect others from the prospect of repeated injury.”).
198. See supra Part V.
199. See, e.g., State v. Sexton, 904 A.2d 1092, 1100 (Vt. 2006) (explaining that the
immediate effects of drug consumption cannot satisfy the mental disease or defect requirement). The MPC expressly provides that intoxication does not “in itself, constitute mental disease.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(3) (1962).
200. See United States v. Drew, 25 F. Cas. 913, 913 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828).
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requirement as part of their insanity standards.201 Furthermore,
courts have had few qualms about considering intoxication to be a
mental disease or defect when the intoxication is involuntary,202 despite the effects of drug consumption on the mind being the same regardless of how the drugs were consumed.
Medical professionals have concluded that intoxication can in some
cases be a mental disease. Hotz attempted to prove that, due to the
immediate effects of his drug consumption, he suffered from “hallucinogen-induced intoxication delirium” and a “hallucinogen-induced
psychotic disorder,” both of which are included as mental disorders in
the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).203 Although the DSM is not
sacrosanct,204 the APA is the governing body of a group of doctors
solely devoted to treating mental illnesses and their conclusions
should not be ignored by courts deciding what constitutes a mental
disease.
As noted by the Nebraska Supreme Court, Hotz’s alleged insanity
was “voluntary” in the sense that he voluntarily consumed the chemical agent that caused his mental impairment.205 However, courts
have not shied away from accepting mental diseases like syphilis that
have a “quasi-voluntary” nature.206 Furthermore, a distinction can be
made between the voluntariness of Hotz’s alteration of his mental
state and the voluntariness of the acts he committed while in a state
of insanity. Ultimately, by somewhat summarily denying Hotz an excuse on the basis of the mental disease or defect requirement, the Nebraska Supreme Court failed to explore Hotz’s criminal liability in the
context of the complicated issues of culpability and public welfare
raised by temporary drug-induced insanity.

201. See Allen v. State, 539 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (alteration in
original) (quoting Lister v. State, 437 So. 2d 622, 624 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“Although excessive intoxication may produce insanity . . . ‘legal insanity does not embrace every kind of mental disease
and disorder that renders a person not responsible for his acts.’ ”).
202. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 858 (Minn. 1976) (“[A]
defense of involuntary intoxication should be allowed only in cases where the defendant at the time of committing the alleged criminal act was laboring under
such a defect of reason because of a mental deficiency caused by involuntary intoxication as not to know the nature of his act, or that it was wrong.”).
203. Other offenders have similarly availed themselves of the DSM without success.
See, e.g., People v. Free, 447 N.E.2d 218, 230–32 (Ill. 1983).
204. State v. Klein, 124 P.3d 644, 651 (Wash. 2005).
205. See supra Part V.
206. WILLIAMS, supra note 182, § 181, at 566.
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IX. THE OFFENSE OF RECKLESS OR NEGLIGENT
INTOXICATION
One may wonder, “[i]f a man is punished for doing something when
drunk that he would not have done when sober, is he not in plain
truth punished for getting drunk?”207 The answer to this question
may be yes, but some acts of drug consumption are deserving of criminal sanction beyond penalties for consumption itself if the drug is illegal. Nevertheless, while the criminal law has long “compromise[d]
between the punishment of inebriate offenders in complete disregard
of their condition, because it was brought on voluntarily, and the total
exculpation suggested by the actual facts at the time the harm occurred,”208 the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision in Hotz has swung
the pendulum too far in the former direction.
A solution to the tension between the lack of an offender’s culpability for acts committed while insane and the need to protect the public
is to: (1) excuse criminal acts committed by an offender suffering from
temporary drug-induced insanity, and (2) create a new offense of reckless or negligent intoxication. The first step would prevent the injustice of holding an offender criminally liable for an act committed while
insane. The second step recognizes that if an offender like Hotz was
culpable for the crimes he committed in a state of temporary insanity,
it is due to his decision, while sane, to consume a drug while cognizant
or having notice of the potential harm to others.209 An offense of reckless or negligent intoxication, therefore, would rightly direct courts to
view the act of consuming drugs, rather than later acts committed in a
state of temporary insanity, as the act deserving of punishment. In
addition to being superior to the traditional no-excuse rule on retributive grounds, this approach would also serve the public interest in the
incapacitation of individuals who have manifested a willingness to become grossly intoxicated while knowing or having reason to know of
the risks to others that their drug consumption may pose.
No American jurisdiction has adopted an offense of reckless or negligent intoxication. There is, however, an example of a similar offense
across the Atlantic. The German Draft Penal Code provides:
(1) Anybody who intentionally or negligently becomes intoxicated with alcoholic beverages or other intoxicants shall be punished with penal custody or a
fine . . . if he commits an unlawful act while in such state and cannot be punished for it, because as a result of the intoxication he was either irresponsible
or his irresponsibility cannot be ruled out. (2) If the perpetrator foresaw or
could foresee that he might commit unlawful acts while intoxicated, the punishment shall be jailing up to five years, penal custody or a fine. (3) The pun207. Id. at 564.
208. Hall, supra note 185, at 1054.
209. See PETER CLYNE, GUILTY BUT INSANE: ANGLO-AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD INSANITY AND CRIMINAL GUILT 28 (1973).
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ishment may not exceed in kind and degree the punishment provided for the
commission of the act committed while intoxicated . . . .210

Support for a similar legislative enactment has been voiced in American courts211 and was discussed in the Nebraska Legislature during
consideration of L.B. 100.212
The creation of a new offense of reckless or negligent intoxication
would, of course, present the legislature and ultimately the courts
with difficult questions. Reckless intoxication should be punished
more severely than negligent intoxication, given that recklessness is a
more culpable mens rea, but how should the offense be graded in light
of the magnitude of the risk and the actual harm wrought? Should the
offense only apply to those offenders who have been excused for their
commission of a subsequent criminal act by reason of their temporary
insanity? What risk need the defendant have subjectively disregarded
(or objectively should have been aware of) in order to justify criminal
liability? Yet, despite definitional challenges, the offense of reckless
or negligent intoxication has the potential to strike a better balance
between the competing concerns of an offender’s culpability and the
public welfare.
X. CONCLUSION
In 1893, the Nebraska Supreme Court, confronted with an intoxicated defendant, declared: “As much as we may desire to discourage
drunkenness, and as deplorable the habit of drinking, with its train of
wrecks and ruin, may be, we must still recognize the frailty of human
beings, and adopt [sic] the law to the actual condition of the party.”213
210. COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW PROJECT, THE GERMAN DRAFT PENAL CODE E 1962,
§ 351, at 189 (Neville Ross trans., 1966). An offense of “being drunk and dangerous” was also enacted in Denmark. WILLIAMS, supra note 182, § 183, at 573 n.7.
Commentators in the United States have expressed support for a law similar to
the German provision. See Chad J. Layton, Comment, No More Excuses: Closing
the Door on the Voluntary Intoxication Defense, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535, 563
(1997).
211. See People v. Kelley, 176 N.W.2d 435, 442 n.23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (“Entirely
rational and workable would be . . . the crime of committing crimes under the
influence of drug or liquor.”).
212. During floor debate on L.B. 100, one senator noted that, “[t]here was an option
presented that could have been considered, that was rejected, which would create
an offense . . . for those who voluntarily ingest a controlled substance and then
commit a crime, and it would be a stated offense where you wouldn’t have to give
these jury instructions with regard to whether or not the individual had formed
the necessary intent. . . . [T]hat’s the better direction I believe for this state to go
in.” Floor Deb. on L.B. 100, supra note 98, at 13 (statement of Sen. Council). As
Senator Council suggested, the offense of reckless or negligent intoxication would
apply to defendants who lacked the requisite mens rea because of their intoxication in addition to those offenders who formed the requisite mens rea in a fit of
temporary drug-induced insanity.
213. O’Grady v. State, 36 Neb. 320, 322, 54 N.W. 556, 556–57 (1893).
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Joseph Hotz’s use of psilocybin mushrooms certainly left a saddening
trail of wrecks and ruin. The Nebraska Supreme Court in State v.
Hotz, however, failed to adapt the law to the actual condition of the
offender. Instead, Hotz was punished as if he had stabbed Kenny
Pfeiffer fifty-one times while perfectly sober, not temporarily insane
from the effects of drugs.
Such a result is at odds with the court’s intimations that Hotz may
have been excused if his drug-induced insanity was of the permanent
variety caused by years of drug abuse. Given that the true basis for
culpability was founded not on the actual stabbing, which was done
while Hotz was temporarily insane, but on the decision to become intoxicated knowing the drug’s possible effects, it is odd that Hotz may
have escaped criminal liability altogether if he had been a heavier
drug user. If anything, the individual who abuses drugs over a prolonged period to such a degree that he permanently alters the way his
brain functions is much more culpable due to the countless number of
times he has placed the public welfare in jeopardy by becoming intoxicated. All that can be said in favor of the temporary/settled insanity
distinction struck by the court is that it serves the utilitarian aim of
incapacitation.
Punishing the temporarily insane offender creates a tug-and-pull
between the two competing justifications for punishment: retributivism and utilitarianism. A criminal act committed in a state of temporary drug-induced insanity is not as culpable as the same act
committed by a sober offender. Those who choose to take drugs knowing or having notice of the risk that their intoxication may pose to
others are dangerous, however, and their incapacitation protects the
public. The Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision—that temporary
drug-induced insanity does not palliate criminal liability in any way—
furthered the utilitarian aim of incapacitation at the expense of ignoring Hotz’s diminished culpability.
Following the passage of L.B. 100, however, the legal status of temporary drug-induced insanity is beyond the Nebraska Supreme
Court’s power to remedy. A better balance between the competing
aims of retributivism and utilitarianism can be struck by a law declaring that temporary drug-induced insanity operates as an excuse and
creating an offense of reckless or negligent intoxication. This new offense would better serve retributive goals by basing culpability on the
reckless or negligent decision to consume drugs instead of the act committed while temporarily insane. Society’s interest in incapacitation
will continue to be served by the punishment of those who consume
drugs knowing or having reason to know that they are endangering
others. Joseph Hotz may well have deserved punishment, but not for
those acts committed while temporarily insane.

